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 1. Introduction 
 Populism is one of the most important current topics in global politics. Cities in Japan are no exception to the 
rise of populist politics.  In Japan, populist politicians, such as Shintaro Ishihara (Tokyo), Toru Hashimoto 
(Osaka), and Takashi Kawamura (Nagoya), emerged in large cities with the start of the 2000s 1 .  Although their 
political ideologies are different, they all attack the establishment and make appeals to the people through the 
media. 
 　 However, there have been few major cross-disciplinary studies on populism and urban politics.  On the one 
hand, with the exception of some studies by Clark and Ferguson (1983), Swanstrom (1985), and DeLeon (1993), 
urban studies scholars have not focused on populism.  On the other hand, although there are many studies on 
radical right populism in not only political science but also sociology (e.g., Betz 1994; Rydgren 2004; Norris 
2005; Mudde 2007; Berezin 2009), this field of research does not overlap much with urban politics 2 . 
 　 In this study, I focused on political mobilization in order to study populism in cities.  Political mobilization is a 
difficult task in the age of “post-democracy” (Crouch 2003), and populist mobilization is now a keyword (Jansen 
2011, Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017).  According to Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017), three types of populist 
mobilization can be identified: personalist leadership, social movement, and political party.  These types are 
important factors in the study of urban populist movements. 
 　 This study analyzes a populist movement in the city of Nagoya to understand how such movements mobilize 
people to challenge urban regimes (Stone 1989).  Nagoya is the third largest city in Japan, and Takashi 
Kawamura, a populist mayor, has governed it since 2009.  This case study indicates the difficulty of organizing 
and mobilizing political parties because, in contemporary cities, mobilization through personalist leadership and 
social movements is often temporary. 
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 2. Case Background 
 The Context of the Populist Movement in Nagoya 
 Post-war Nagoya witnessed a conflict between economic development and social welfare policies (see table 1). 
The conservatives (“ Hosyu ”) valued economic liberalism and Japanese tradition, while the progressives 
(“ Kakushin ”) oriented themselves toward economic redistribution and socialist democracy.  However, the split 
in the progressive groups in the 1980s brought about a collaborative regime that balanced development and 
welfare through the coordination of the city assembly (Kida 2016). 
 　 In Nagoya, voters’ participation declined over a long period of time (see Figure 1).  This condition generated 
an urban populist movement.  In 2009, Takashi Kawamura, who skillfully appealed to the electorate with populist 
rhetoric, was elected mayor.  He preferred to use populistic expressions such as “ordinary people’s revolution” 
 Syomin-Kakumei .  One of his principal policies is tax cuts for “ordinary people,” and he established a local party 
Table 1　The Political Regime in Nagoya
Regime type Mayor Political goal
Developmental
Zou Tsukamoto (1947―1952)
Post-war reconstruction and high economic growthKissen Kobayashi (1952―1961)
Kiyoshi Sugito (1961―1973)
Progressive Masao Motoyama (1973―1985) Civic welfare and growth management
Collaborative Takeyoshi Nishio (1985―1997) Coexistence of development and welfare (early)
Takehisa Matsubara (1997―2009) Administrative reform (later)











Mayoral Elec on City Assembly Elec on
Figure 1　The Decline of Voters’ Participation
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called “Tax Cuts Japan” ( Genzei Nippon , TCJ).  Some foreign media such as Reuters labeled him “Tea Party” 
mayor 3 . 
 　 One remarkable event was the success of a recall referendum movement against the city assembly.  Mayor 
Kawamura organized a campaign to demand the recall of the city assembly in the summer of 2010 because the 
assembly had rejected the reduction of rewards for the city council members.  The campaign grew in popularity, 
and a network of supporters grew within the electorate.  The total number of signatures gathered was about 
369,000, and the campaign succeeded.  In the recall referendum held on February 6, 2011, 73.35% voted “Yes” 
for the recall.  On the same day, Kawamura was elected mayor for the second time. 
 　 However, Mayor Kawamura’s party was not successful.  Although TCJ was the leading parliamentary group 
in the March 2011 election, its members faced severe criticism because of their political scandals.  As TCJ’s 
seats in the city assembly decreased gradually (Table 2), they failed to gain power.  Kawamura’s influence on city 
politics was now restricted because the city assembly tends to check the influence of populist power on decision-
making. 
 The Social Base of the Populist Movement 
 Who supported the populist movement? Kawamura mobilized people who usually did not participate actively in 
local politics.  Younger voters and those who were not members of any political organization tended to vote for 
Kawamura in 2011 (Table 3).  Some social and political attitudes have correlations with support for Mayor 
Kawamura (Table 4).  According to this table, the populist movement in Nagoya has not been radical right and 
neoliberal in nature, but it has been based on strong discontent with the old style of governance and politics. 
Table 2　Parties and Seats in the City Assembly of Nagoya
Party name 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015
Democratic Party 28 24 27 12 16
Liberal Democratic Party 24 25 22 19 22
Komeito 13 14 14 11 12
Japanese Communist Party 10 9 9 5 12
Tax Cuts Japan 28 12
Others 3 3 3 0 1
Total 78 75 75 75 75
Note: This table of calculations is simplified because some of the groups were split up or merged within a short period.
Source: City of Nagoya (http://www.city.nagoya.jp/en/index.html)
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 3. Research Design 
 Three Types of Populist Mobilization 
 Following Mudde and Kalswasser (2017), there are three types of populist mobilization: personalist leadership 
(top-down), social movement (bottom-up), and political party (both).  The three types are as follows. 
 　 The first type is personalist leadership (ibid: 43 ― 44).  Populist movements often have a leader based on his or 
her personal appeal.  Leaders connect directly to his or her supporters, largely unmediated through a strong 
party or social organization.  Their supporters, who are mobilized top-down, feel a personalized connection to 
the leader.  By developing a personal electoral vehicle, populist leaders can portray himself or herself as a clean 














Young (20s―40s) 190 78.40% ＊
Senior (50s―80s) 258 68.20%
Education
Not a university graduate 314 71.30%
n.s.
University graduate or holds a higher qualification 130 73.80%
Income
Low (lower than 300M Yen) 90 74.40%
n.s.Middle (300Myen―900Myen) 233 70.40%
High (more than 900Myen) 110 74.50%
Political Organization
Not a member 399 75.70% ＊＊＊
Member 48 47.90%
Note: Significant at †p＜ .1, ＊p＜ .05, ＊＊p＜ .01, and ＊＊＊p＜ .001.
Source: 2011 Nagoya Survey
Table 4　Attitudes and Support for Mayor Kawamura
Item N Correlation
Negative toward immigrants 571 －.064 n.s.
Positive toward economic competition 568 －.022 n.s.
Positive toward consensus politics 571 －.096＊
Have trust to government professionals 562 －.126＊＊
Positive toward high tax rates 560 －.170＊＊＊
Reformist identity (vs. conservative) 563 .222＊＊＊
Note: Significant at †p＜.1, ＊p＜.05, ＊＊p＜.01, and ＊＊＊p＜.001. 
Supportive attitudes were measured on a five-point Likert scale.
Source: 2011 Nagoya Survey
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actor without being tied to a strong political organization. 
 　 The second type is social movement (ibid: 46 ― 48).  Social movements are informal networks that bring 
together people with a shared identity and a common opponent.  Populist social movements speak about “the 
people” although general social movements tend to develop a common identity for a specific group of individuals. 
However, the mobilization of a populist social movement is bottom-up as well as the mobilization of a general 
social movement is. 
 　 The last type is political party (ibid: 50 ― 53).  Political parties (1) seek to aggregate the interests of different 
sectors of society, (2) elaborate policy programs, and (3) invest time and resources to train personnel for public 
offices.  Populists want to have their representatives in power, and populist political parties challenge the 
establishment.  Populist parties have the ability to win votes and seats, as a result, populist parties are often 
more effective than populist social movements.  Political parties are often not only top-down but also bottom-up. 
In other words, a populist political party needs both leadership and popular support network. 
 Hypotheses 
 I analyzed the social base of the populist movement in Nagoya and tested two hypotheses about the rise and fall 
of the populist movement.  The case of Nagoya is unique in that the three types of populist mobilization, which 
are Mayor Kawamura’s personalist leadership, the recall campaign as a social movement, and TCJ as a populist 
party, are all observable.  The populist mayor encouraged people’s participation in the populist movement.  He 
succeeded in the recall of the city assembly.  However, building a support base for the populist party was not 
successful in this case.  In other words, the populist party that Mayor Kawamura made was not a brilliant 
accomplishment.  As Mudde and Kalwasser (2017: 55) note, top-down mobilization by populist leaders is either 
unsuccessful or it falls apart shortly after achieving electoral breakthrough.  Thus, the hypotheses for this study 
were as follows: 
 H1:  Voters’ participation in the signature campaign during the recall movement raised the amount of “Yes” 
votes for the recall. 
 H2: The recall campaign failed or only slightly managed to increase the support base of the populist party. 
 Data and Methods 
 I used the data of the “2011 Nagoya Survey,” which I had conducted in the summer of 2011.  The sampling 
method was stratified based on a three-stage random sampling procedure.  I sampled 1,333 electorates, and the 
number of respondents was 577 (the response rate was 43.3%).  The response variables were voting “Yes” or 
not “Yes” (i.e. “No” and abstention) in the recall referendum (H1) and being a supporter or non-supporter of TCJ 
(H2).  The explanatory variables were gender (female dummy), age (six-ordinal scale), education level (five-
ordinal scale), household income (six-ordinal scale), participation in the signature campaign during the recall 
movement (dummy), and support for Kawamura (five-ordinal scale).  I used the logistic regression model with 
these data and variables. 
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 4. Analysis 
 Table 3 reports the regression results of the “Yes” votes for the recall and the support for TCJ.  First, we will 
examine the regression results of the “Yes” votes.  Both support for the leader (p＜ .001) and the signature 
participation rate (p＜ .001) were statistically significant.  High education levels tended to raise the probability 
of “Yes” votes for the recall in the model.  Second, with regard to the support for TCJ, the participation and the 
support for the leader were significant (p＜ .001).  Additionally, low income might have increased the probability 
of support for TCJ. 
 　 Figure 2 shows the effects on the response variables through the odds ratios with 95% intervals which was 
estimated based on the logistic regression analyses.  According to this figure, the odds ratio to the “Yes” votes 
for the recall was 4.768, and the odds ratio to the support for TCJ was 1.705.  The ratio to the “Yes” votes was 
thus larger than that to the support for TCJ.  With regard to support for Kawamura, the odds ratio to the “Yes” 
votes for the recall was 2.28, and the odds ratio to the support for TCJ was 3.90.  While the participation strongly 
raised the probability of “Yes” votes for the recall, it did not raise the probability of support for TCJ much. 
Table 5　Logistic Regression Analyses of the Recall Election and Support for TCJ




















Nagelkerke R2 .374 .370
N. of Obs. 527 529
Note: Logistic regression coefficients are presented with standard errors. 
Results are significant at †p＜.1, ＊p＜.05, ＊＊p＜.01, and ＊＊＊p＜.001.
Source: 2011 Nagoya Survey
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 5. Discussion and conclusion 
 In sum, the participation in the signature campaign during the recall movement strongly accelerated the 
movement.  The support for Kawamura increased the probability of the “Yes” votes by a small degree; thus, the 
recall movement was dependent on social movement rather than personalist leadership.  On the other hand, the 
signature participation increased the probability of creating support for TCJ by a small degree but the support for 
Kawamura strongly increased the probability of creating support for TCJ; thus, TCJ failed at organizing signature 
participants and they were dependent on the mayor’s personalist leadership. 
 　 The case of Nagoya is a local movement.  However, it is unique because a populist politician organized a 
social movement.  Kawamura succeeded in his personalist leadership and the recall movement but failed to 
increase his party’s support base.  The populist challenge in Nagoya was unsuccessful in the long term because 
the populist party failed to gain actual power.  In contrast to European populist radical right parties, populist 
groups and parties in Japan fail at establishing electoral persistence because of the difficulty of continuously 
organizing city dwellers 4 .  This case study suggests that establishing electoral persistence is a critical issue for 
populist movements. 
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Figure 2　Effects of Signature Participation and Support Attitude
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 Notes 
 1  Kobori summarizes populist politics in Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya in English (Kobori 2013). 
 2  In Japan, political sociologists have studied urban populist politics. Some papers, such as those of Higuchi and Matsutani (2016) 
and Ito (2017), are available in English. 
 3  See “Nagoya ‘Tea Party’ mayor brews trouble for Japan PM” by Linda Sieg. 
 (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-politics-tea-party/nagoya-tea-party-mayor-brews-trouble-for-japan-pm-
idUSTRE7221SK20110303) 
 4  In the prefecture and the city of Osaka, a charismatic politician Toru Hashimoto created a local populist party “One Osaka” ( Osaka 
Ishin no Kai ), which made an electoral breakthrough in and around the city of Osaka. In 2015 Hashimoto, the mayor of the city of 
Osaka, proposed the Osaka Metropolis Plan referendum, but the electorate rejected it. Hashimoto retired from politics after the 
referendum. The future of One Osaka is unclear because of the retirement of the charismatic leader. 
 References 
 Berezin, Mabel, 2009,  Illiberal Politics in Neoliberal Times: Culture, Security and Populism in the New Europe , Cambridge University 
Press. 
 Betz Hans-Georg, 1994,  Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe , MacMillan. 
 Clark, Terry Nichols and Lorna Crowley Ferguson, 1983,  City Money: Political Processes, Fiscal Strain, and Retrenchment , Columbia 
University Press. 
 Crouch, Colin, 2004,  Post-Democracy , Polity. 
 DeLeon, Richard Edward, 1992,  Left Coast City: Progressive Politics in San Francisco , 1975 ― 1991, University Press of Kansas. 
 Higuchi, Naoto and Mitsuru Matsutani, 2016, “Support for the Radical Right in Japan: Converging to the European Politics?,”  Social 
Theory and Dynamics , 1: 59 ― 68. 
 Jansen, Robert S., 2011, Populist Mobilization: A New Theoretical Approach to Populism,  Sociological Theory , 29(2): 75 ― 96. 
 Kida, Yusuke, 2016, “Rearranging the Urban Regime: A Case Study of Nagoya City since the 1980s,”  The Annals of Japan Association 
for Urban Sociology , 34: 106 ― 123. (in Japanese) 
 Kobori, Masahiro, 2013, “Populism as Rhetorical Politics in Britain and Japan: ‘Devil take the Hindmost’,”  Ritsumeikan Law Review , 
30: 107 ― 121. 
 Mudde, Cas, 2007,  Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe , Cambridge University Press. 
 Mudde, Cas and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017,  Populism: A very short introduction , Oxford University Press. 
 Norris, Pippa, 2005,  Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market , Cambridge University Press. 
 Rydgren, Jens, 2004,  The Populist Challenge: Political Protest and Ethno-Nationalist Mobilization in France , Berghahn Books. 
 Stone, Clarence, 1989,  Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946 ― 1988 , University Press of Kansas. 
 Swanstrom, Todd, 1985,  The Crisis of Growth Politics: Cleveland, Kucinich, and the Challenge of Urban Populism , Temple University 
Press. 
 Takashi, Ito, 2017, “Mass Politics in the Post ― 1955 System: An Empirical Study of Voting Behavior in the 2011 Osaka Mayoral 
Election,”  Osaka Human Sciences , 3: 99 ― 115. 
きだ・ゆうすけ / 文化情報学部准教授
E-mail：kidayusuke@sugiyama-u.ac.jp
